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PARTIALITY, PASSION, AND PREJUDICE: THE NECESSITY
OF POSTVERDICT JUDICIAL REVIEW
Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S.Ct. 2331 (1994)
Troy Kubes***
Respondent, Karl L. Oberg, sought compensatory and punitive damages
for injuries received while driving a three-wheeled all-terrain vehicle.1 The
vehicle was manufactured and sold by the Petitioner, Honda Motor Corp.2
At the trial level, an Oregon jury awarded Oberg both compensatory and
punitive damages, the latter being over five times the amount of the former.'
Honda argued that the punitive damages award violated the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution because the award was excessive and because the
Oregon court system had no power to correct excessive verdicts under a 1910
Amendment to the State Constitution.' The Amendment stated that a
judicial review of the amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury is
unwarranted "unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to

* Editor's Note: This case comment received the Huber C. Hurst Award for the
outstanding case comment for Fall 1994.
** I wish to thank Angela Izzo-Peppe and Nathania Bates, both as advisors and as
friends. Additionally, my love and thanks to my parents, George and Eleanor Kubes, for their
unconditional support and love.
1. Honda Motor Corp. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2334 (1994) [hereinafter Oberg I].
Oberg alleged that Honda knew or should have known that the vehicle had an inherently and
unreasonably dangerous design. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. The trial lasted four weeks, but the jury (in an 11 to 1 decision) only took five
hours to return a verdict for Oberg. Punitive Damages Awarded Against an All-Terrain
Vehicle Manufacturer, 32 ATLA L. REP. 412, 413 (1989). Honda was found liable for the
accident, and the trial jury awarded Oberg $919,390.39 in compensatory damages and
$5,000,000 in punitive damages. Oberg I, 114 S.Ct. at 2334. The amount of compensatory
damages was reduced by 20% ($735,512.31) since the Court found that Oberg's negligence
had contributed to the accident. Id.
4. Oberg v. Honda Motor Corp., 108 Or. App. 43 (Or. Ct. App. 1991). The 1910
Amendment to the State Constitution of Oregon eliminated any judicial review standard that
once had been available in Oregon. See Van Lom v. Schneiderman, 187 Or. 89, 93 (1949).
The amended article provides the Oregon courts with the following:
In actions of law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise re-examined in any court of this State, unless the court can affirmatively
say there is no evidence to support the verdict.
OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (amended 1910).
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support the verdict."5 Both the Oregon Court of Appeals 6 and the Oregon
Supreme Court 7 rejected Honda's argument.' The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari9 and HELD that Oregon's denial of review of the
size of punitive damage awards violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.l"
Even before the Due Process Clause, the court system was concerned
As early as the
with verdicts that awarded excessive punitive damages.
the review of
against
rules
absolute
rejected
mid-1700s, the English courts
2
damages. Those courts continually reserved the power to order new trials
when the damages awarded were too high. 3 After the American Colonies
gained independence from England, the U.S. common law courts followed
the lead of the English by granting judicial review of the size of damages
awarded. 14 Many U.S. courts used a review standard that examined whether
the jury was partial or whether passion and prejudice played a role in its
decision. 5 Even though the English and U.S. systems generally followed
5. OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (amended 1910).
6. Oberg, 108 Or. App. at 53.
7. Oberg v. Honda Motor Corp., 316 Or. 263, 289 (1993) [hereinafter Oberg I1]. The
Supreme Court of Oregon relied heavily on the safeguards that the Oregon system uses in
punitive damages cases. Primarily, the court focused on the detailed jury instructions and the
clear and convincing evidence standard used by the jury. The court found these safeguards
to be as or more effective than other states' safeguards to prevent excessive punitive damage
awards. Id. at passim.
8. Id. at 266; Oberg, 108 Or. App. at 49-5 1.
9. Honda Motor Corp. v. Oberg, 510 U.S. 1068 (1994). The Supreme Court decided
to consider whether Oregon's limited judicial review of punitive damage awards was
consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Oberg , 114 S. Ct.
at 2334.
10. Oberg 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2342. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the
Oregon courts and remanded the case back to the Oregon Supreme Court for further
proceedings in line with the instant decision. Id.
11. See cases cited infra notes 12, 14-15.
12. See Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 206 (C. P. 1763) (finding no absolute rule against
review of the amount of damages awarded and determining that when damages are
"outrageous" and "all mankind at first blush must think so" a new trial must be ordered);
Leith v. Pope, 2 Black W. 1327, 1328 (C. P. 1779) ("In cases of tort the Court will not
interpose on account of the largeness of damages, unless they are so flagrantly excessive as
to afford an internal evidence of the prejudice and partiality of the jury."). But see Brief for
Legal Historians Daniel R. Coquillette et. al. as Amicus Curiae at 2, Oberg . There is no
evidence that different standards of judicial review were applied for punitive and compensatory damages before the twentieth century. Id.
13. See cases cited supra note 12.
14. See, e.g., Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760 (CC Mass. 1822); Whipple v. Cumberland
Mfg. Co., 29 F. Cas. 934 (CC Mass. 1822).
15. Oberg I, 114 S. Ct. at 2337. Judges had a problem with determining the basis of the
jurors' reasoning so they began to infer passion, prejudice, or partiality from the size of the
award. See Belknap v. Boston & Maine R.R., 49 N.H. 358, 374 (1870) ("We think it evident
that the jury were affected by some partiality or prejudice from some cause, and that their
verdict ought for that reason to be set aside.").
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the verdicts of the jury, the courts of both countries also realized that juries
had the potential to award excessive damages in violation of an individual's
right to due process of law.
An early U.S. case that ruled in favor of common law traditions and the
due process of law was Tumey v. Ohio.' 6 Tumey was arrested and charged
with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. 7 Tumey moved to dismiss
the case, claiming the Mayor should be disqualified from trying him. 8
Tumey's reasoning was that the Mayor received a portion of any imposed
fine as compensation. 9 The motion was denied, and the Mayor tried and
convicted Tumey.2 ° The Supreme Court found this practice to be a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in that it deprived a defendant of due
process of law because the judge had interests other than justice.2'
The Tumey Court looked to "those settled usages and modes of
proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England before the
emigration of our ancestors" that have been used since the settlement of this
country.2" The Court did not hesitate to find the proceeding violative of
due process since Tumey was deprived of a well-established common law
protection." In effect, the Court established that it would enforce common
law traditions rather than uphold laws and statutes that deprive a defendant
of essential due process mechanisms. Based on the Tumey decision, it would
appear that the ground for judicial review of due process violations is well
founded in U.S. history. However, Oregon departed from the traditional
scope of review in adopting the 1910 Amendment to the Oregon
Constitution.24
In the case of Van Loin v. Schneiderman,2 5 the Oregon State Supreme
Court interpreted the 1910 Amendment.2 6 The plaintiff, Van Lom, sought

16. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
17. Id. at 515.

18. Id. Tumey founded his argument under the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.

19. Id. As part of Ordinance No. 125, Section V stated "[t]hat the mayor of the village
of North College Hill, Ohio, shall receive or retain the amount of his costs in each case, in
addition to his regular salary, as compensation for hearing such case." Id. at 519.
20. Id. at 515.
21. Id. at 523.
22. Id.; see, e.g., Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken
Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. 272 (1856).
23. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 535. The Tumey Court determined that a procedure in which the
judge had a direct pecuniary interest denied the defendant due process of law. Id. at 532.
24. Oberg 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2335.
25. 187 Or. 89 (1949).
26. Id. at 113. The Oregon Supreme Court noted that since the adoption of the 1910
Constitutional Amendment, Oregon courts do not have the power to set aside verdicts for
unliquidated damages on the ground that the verdict is excessive. Id. at 94. The only power
the courts have to challenge the damage award is to examine the record and determine
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both compensatory and punitive damages for assault and battery, and false
imprisonment.2 7 The jury returned a verdict that granted Van Loin the
entire amount requested.2" The defendant, Schneiderman, appealed the
judgment, arguing that the damages were excessive.29 The court was of the
opinion that the damages were excessive, but stated, "[A] majority are of the
opinion that this court has no power to disturb the verdict .... '3o The
court held that it had "no right or authority to subvert its obvious purpose or
to refuse to apply its provisions to the full extent of their evident
meaning.'
Thus, under Van Loin, a defendant in Oregon is at the total
mercy of the jury since the courts have no power to set aside excessive
damages.32
On the other hand, in direct conflict with Oregon's ruling in Van Lore,
the U.S. Supreme Court, in the landmark decision of Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip,3 3 confirmed the necessity of judicial review of
excessive damages for due process purposes. The Haslip Court found that
the Constitution imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive damage
awards. 34 The Court again approved the common law method for determining punitive damages.35
In Haslip, Haslip and several others purchased health and life insurance
through a Pacific Mutual Life Insurance agent. 36 The agent misused the
funds, and in turn, Haslip's health insurance coverage was cancelled.3 7

whether there is any evidence to support the verdict. Id. at 95.
27. Id. at 91.
28. Id. The plaintiff received $5000 in compensatory damages and $5000 in punitive
damages. Id.
29. Id. The stories of the defendant and the plaintiff were quite different. Even though
their testimonies conflicted, there was no evidence that the plaintiff had been seriously injured.
Id. at 93. It was discovered that the plaintiff's injuries consisted of a bruise on her leg and
wrist. Id. Also, she did not miss any work after the assault. Id. These facts were the basis
for questioning the amount awarded in the instant case. Id.
30. Id. The Supreme Court of Oregon explained its circumstance under the 1910
Amendment. The Supreme Court was authorized by the Amendment only to either "affirm
the judgment, notwithstanding any error committed during the trial, or to direct the entry of
such judgment as should have been entered in the court below." Id. at 100.
31. Id. at 113; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 406-07 ("It must never
be forgotten that it is a constitution we are expounding.").
32. Van Lore, 187 Or. at 93. For further discussion, see supra note 30 and accompanying
text.
33. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
34. See id. at 18. As in Tumey, the Haslip Court stressed the importance of enforcing due
process in damage awards. Id. at passim. This shows the consistency of the U.S. Supreme
Court while the Oregon courts have opposed judicial review of jury awards.
35. Id. at 15. The common law method instructed the jury to consider the gravity of the
wrong and the need to deter this type of wrong. The jury's decision would then be reviewed
by the trial and the appellate courts to ensure the amount was reasonable. Id.
36. Id. at 4-5.
37. Id. at 5.
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After she was hospitalized, Haslip lost a claim against a doctor for unpaid
bills.3"
She then filed suit against Pacific Mutual, claiming that the
insurance company, under a theory of respondeatsuperior,was to blame for
the policy that had lapsed without her knowledge.39 The Court found for
Haslip with a punitive damage award of at least $840,000.40
Pacific Mutual appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging Alabama's
punitive damage process as the "product of unbridled jury discretion and as
violative of its due process rights."' Though the court ruled there was no
violation of due process, the Justices did express their individual opinions on
the matter. In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor said that "one must
concede that unlimited jury discretion ... in the fixing of punitive damages
may invite extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities." '2 This
standard from Haslip is a modem approach to excessive punitive damages
and is similar to the historical view that due process requires judicial review
of a jury's verdict to avoid unjustly punishing a defendant.4 3
In the instant case, the U.S. Supreme Court continued the trend of
reviewing potential violations of due process. It applied the standard set out
in Haslip in determining whether the Due Process Clause requires judicial
review of the amount of punitive damage awards." Use of the Haslip
standard was necessary since the Court ruled that the Constitution imposes
a substantive limit on punitive damage awards.45 The Court began with the
question of whether Oregon had departed from traditional procedures.46
Since Honda was liable for punitive damages in excess of five times the
amount of compensatory damages without the benefit of judicial review for

38. Id.
39. Id. at 5-6.
40. Id. at 7 n.2. The punitive damage award must have been at least $840,000 since in
Haslip's argument to the jury, counsel requested compensatory damages of $200,000. If full
compensatory damages had been awarded, then punitive damages would have been $840,000
(i.e., jury award of $1,040,000 minus full compensatory damages of $200,000 = $840,000).
Id.
41. Id. at 7. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review Alabama's punitive
damages procedures and the award. Pacific Mutual Life Insur. v. Haslip, 494 U.S. 1065
(1991).
42. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18. Justice Brennan stated that the Court cannot draw a bright
line between which punitive damage awards are constitutionally acceptable and which are
unacceptable. He said that the important elements that the Court should consider are the
reasonableness of the award and the guidance given to the jury by the court. Id.
43. Id. at 15. For an explanation of the common law method, see supra note 35 and
accompanying text.
44. Oberg I, 114 S. Ct. at 2334-35.
45. See id. at 2335. Haslip emphasized the importance of an effective procedural component to counter arbitrary awards given by the jury. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20. The Court
desired to have "meaningful and adequate review by the trial court" and subsequent appellate
review. Id.
46. Oberg/, 114 S. Ct. at 2338.
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excessive awards,47 the Court did not hesitate to look at Oregon's abrogation of a well-established common law protection.4"
While looking at Oregon's deviation from the national standard, the
Court strengthened its review by including the reasoning from Tumey and
concluding that well-established procedures cannot be abandoned when due
process is being impeded.49 The jury in the instant case was given nearly
pure discretion in penalizing Honda for the vehicle mishap.50 The Court
noted that the Due Process Clause is concerned with arbitrary deprivations
of liberty or property, which it viewed as the problem in the instant case.51
Also, since all of the other states incorporated the common law practice of
judicial review, there was a strong presumption in favor of judicial review of
punitive damages.52 The Court held that in light of a possible deprivation
of Honda's property, an unreviewable jury decision should not be enforced.5 3
In contrast, the dissent saw Oregon's departure from the standard
procedure as adequate since its adopted procedures conformed with the
standards set out in the Constitution.54 In the dissent, Justice Ginsburg also
considered the decision in Haslip and concluded that limits rather than set
standards had been given in that case.55 According to Justice Ginsburg, the
procedural standards that Oregon imposed on the jury were adequate to keep
awards within the limits imposed by the Court in Haslip.6 Justice
Ginsburg therefore found the Court's procedural directive to the Oregon
courts to be neither necessary nor proper.57
The instant case finally gave the Supreme Court the chance to set a

47. Id. at 2334. For a discussion of the damage awards, see supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
48. See id. at 2336-38.
49. Id. at 2340.
50. See id. at 2341. The instant Court recognized that Oregon had pre-verdict procedures
to instruct the jury on granting awards. Its concern was the possibility that the jury might
disregard the instructions and return a biased and arbitrary award. Id. But see id. at 2344
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The procedures Oregon's courts followed in this case satisfy the
due process limits indicated in Haslip ... ; the jurors were adequately guided by the trial
court's instructions ...
51. Id. at 2342.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2343. The dissent noted the following limits that conform to the Constitution's
due process threshold: (1) the plaintiff must establish entitlement to punitive damages by clear
and convincing evidence under specific substantive criteria, and (2) the decision of the jury
is subject to judicial review if the jury was improperly instructed or there was no evidence to
support the verdict. Id.
55. Id. The Court in Haslip refused to "draw a mathematical bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable." 499 U.S. at 18.
56. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20.
57. Oberg 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2350 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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standard of review for questions of excessive punitive damages. The instant
Court was able to use its judicial history and common law tradition to
reinforce its decision that Oregon's deviation from the national standard of
judicial review was unjust. 58

Also, the Court, in defining the broad

standards for punitive damages in Haslip, mandated that states have some
system for postverdict judicial review. 9 The narrowing of the Haslip
standard to limit state choices in preventing excessive punitive damages
caused Justice Ginsburg to question the majority's desire and intentions.6 °
The majority's decision was based on the following: (1) reliance on common
law tradition, (2) Oregon's deviation from the rest of the states in review
standards, (3) a strong presumption ofjudicial review, and (4) considerations
of justice. 6' Based on these factors, the Court concluded that judicial
review of possibly excessive punitive damages is required by the Due Process
Clause. 62
The reasoning of the Court is the key to the decision reached in the
instant case. After examining the subject of excessive punitive damages for
the third time in four years,63 the Court was anxious and determined to
define a standard for punitive damages. Not only did the instant Court
clarify its stand on punitive damages, but it also laid a foundation for others
to challenge the amount of punitive damages awarded against them.' The
Court effectively molded its decision in Haslip to fit its desire to curtail the
award of excessive punitive damages. 5
For many years, the Court had been looking for the opportunity to
overrule juries' punitive damage awards. 66 Oregon proved to be the victim
with its original adoption of review procedures that were not in line with
national standards.6 7 The Court most likely felt a sense of duty to help

58. See cases cited supra notes 12, 14-15.
59. See Oberg I, 114 S. Ct. at 2342.
60. Id. at 2348-49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at passim.
62. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15.
63. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989);
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991); TXO Production Co. v. Alliance Resources, 113 S. Ct. 2711

(1993).
64. Sheila L. Birnbaum & J. Russell Jackson, In Oberg, the High Court ClarifledIts Stand
on Punitive Damages, Laying a Foundationfor Future ConstitutionalChallenges to Awards,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1, 1994, at B4. This commentary observed that the Court had clarified its
position by requiring that judges must review the amount of the punitive award. Also, the
Court's concern about unfair awards and the possibility of historical change that would require
adjustment of punitive damages was viewed as an opportunity for others to make future
challenges. Id.
65. See Oberg 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2335.
66. See cases cited supra note 63.
67. See Oberg 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2335-38; see also Claudia MacLachlan, High Court Takes
Another Look at Punitive Damages, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 31, 1994, at 17 (Honda's attorney,

380

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA W AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 7

fellow judges out of a situation where the Oregon legislation disallowed
judicial review of punitive damages.68 The lack of power that gave rise to
this predisposition was voiced in the Van Lom decision.6 9 The Oregon
court took a legalistic approach in defining the 1910 Amendment handed
down by the legislature. 70 Thus, the court, knowing the award was
excessive, found it had no power under the Amendment to reverse. 7' The
Supreme Court found a perfect chance in the instant case to reestablish
judicial supremacy in determining review standards.
To establish its position, the majority, as Justice Stevens detailed, listed
an abundance of cases to support its position. 72 As mentioned above, the
Court was eager to set a standard that would limit excessive punitive
damages. 73 To effectively enact this standard, the instant Court needed
Constitutional backing to avoid criticism. It therefore focused solely on a
due process requirement for judicial review. 74 The Court was supported by
past instances of review of due process violations including the Tumey
decision. 75 The Court established a pattern of upholding the power of the
76
court system to give each person a fair trial and punishment, if necessary.
The award in the instant case was viewed as an injustice to the Honda
Corporation since the opportunity for review was effectively eliminated from
the Oregon court system.7 7
Not only did the instant Court look to cases involving due process claims
such as Tumey, but it also looked back to common law traditions from both
early American and English courts. 78 These past traditions gave rise to the
Court's concern for protecting the defendant from undue partiality or from

Andrew L. Frey, said, "I feel extremely optimistic that we are going to win the case because
Oregon is so out of step with the rest of the Anglo-American legal system.").
68. Van Lom, 187 Or. at 113. The judges in the Van Lom decision were of the opinion
that the amended article of the Oregon Constitution was an ill-considered legislation. See id.
Though the majority of the judges believed this proposition, they also knew they did not have
the power or authority to subvert the obvious purpose or to refuse to apply the provisions of
the amended article. Id. Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court Justices might try to correct the
situation that made fellow judges powerless and deem the amended article unconstitutional.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 93.
71. See id. at 93, 113.
72. See cases cited supra note 12.
73. See cases cited supra note 63.
74. See Oberg 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2334.
75. See Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523.

76. Oberg 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2339-40. The Court noted that very few cases have arisen in
which a party complained of having been denied due process since the basic common law
protections are regarded as so fundamental. In the instances where they have surfaced, most
of the arguments were based on the fact that due process procedures offer too little protection.
Id. at 2340.
77. See id. at 2341.
78. See cases cited supra notes 12, 14-15.
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the passion and prejudice of the jury.7 9 This concern was mentioned as
recently as the Haslip case by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion."0
The Court's desire to avoid partiality, passion, and prejudice by the jury
is in the forefront in the instant case. Commentaries have suggested that the
instant case is big business' best chance to gain a victory over the punitive
damages that have been haunting them." The majority recognized the
important policy arguments surrounding this decision. Honda was viewed as
an outsider that had a considerable amount of money, while Oberg was
viewed as a local citizen who was injured by the negligent behavior of the
multi-million dollar company.8 2 This bias against big businesses was bad
enough, but, as Justice Stevens stated, "judicial review of the amount
awarded was one of the few procedural safeguards which the common law
provided against that danger."83 Since this safeguard was removed by the
Oregon legislature and no adequate substitute procedure was enacted, Honda
did not have any protection against arbitrary awards." 4 Thus, the Oregon
amendment was viewed as a violation of the Due Process Clause.

79. Eric Schapper, Judges Against Juries - Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury
Verdicts, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 237, 243-44. Schapper noted that there is an absence of any
meaningful legal standard to determine punitive damage awards. "In the absence of more
specific guidance ... [such a vague standard] virtually invit[es] juries to punish unpopular
defendants." Id. at 343.
80. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 27. Justice Scalia discussed the history of jury discretion. He
argued there were no set procedures established to deal with the possibility of jury discretion
in an award of damages and its amount. Even though procedural safeguards were deemed
unnecessary, Justice Scalia noted several commentators who have concluded that judicial
review is appropriate. Id.; see G. FIELD, LAW OF DAMAGES 65 (1876) ("The amount of
damages ...are necessarily largely within the discretion of the jury; the only check ...
[occurs] where it is manifest that the jury were unduly influenced by passion, prejudice,
partiality, or corruption ....");J. SUTHERLAND, LAW OF DAMAGES 742 (1882) ("[Punitive
damages] are left to the discretion of the jury, but subject to the power of the court to set
aside the verdict if it is so excessive that the court may infer that the jury have been
influenced by passion or prejudice.").
81. MacLachlan, supra note 67, at 17 (The reason for this hope is the U.S. Supreme
Court's ongoing concern with the constitutional issues raised by punitive damages. Oberg I
was the fourth punitive damage challenge case in five years to be reviewed by the Court.).
82. Oberg 1, 114 S.Ct. at 2340-41. The Court continued to stress the importance of not
permitting the arbitrary deprivation of property. The rise of large, interstate and multinational
companies has aggravated the problem of bias and arbitrary awards. Id. at 2340. Juries have
the tendency to feel that a rich, powerful, non-local entity should pay for the damages it has
done to a fellow citizen. See id.at 2340-41.
83. Id. at 2341.
84. Id. The Respondent countered Honda's claim by pointing out four safeguards
provided by the Oregon court system: (1) a limitation of punitive damages to the amount
specified but no limit to the amount requested, (2) a clear and convincing standard of proof,
but those who pass the standard are still subjected to the possibility of arbitrary awards, (3)
Oregon courts are able to set maximum punitive damage awards, but there is no evidence to
support the idea that this has ever been done in any jurisdiction, and (4) proper jury
instructions, but of course, juries may disregard the instructions. Id.
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Though the Court gave sufficient judicial tradition, case law, and
concerns for justice in support of its reasoning, 5 Justice Ginsburg, in
dissent, was troubled by the majority's alienation of Oregon and its punitive
damage review standards.8 6 Justice Ginsburg stated that the evidence given
by the majority did not point to judicial review standards, but instead
supported the review standards already employed by the Oregon courts.8 7
Haslip did not give any guidance to specific measures needed to satisfy due
process claims. 8 The dissent focused on the preverdict mechanisms that
guided the jurors in their decision.8 9 These standards as applied to Haslip
closely guided the jurors in making their award.9 ° Justice Ginsburg viewed
the majority as punishing Oregon for providing preverdict measures instead
of the consensus postverdict review.9
Several factors influenced Justice Ginsburg's opinion. For one, the
majority's view on past history of judicial review was limited.92 As pointed
out by Justice Scalia in Haslip, "no particular procedures were deemed
necessary to circumscribe a jury's discretion regarding the award of
[punitive] damages, or their amount. '93 Also, Oregon historically has done

85. See id. at 2341-42.
86. See id. at 2350 (Ginsburg, J.,dissenting). Justice Ginsburg concluded that the
majority's procedures of judicial review enforced against the Oregon courts were neither
necessary nor proper. This opinion is supported by Justice Ginsburg's view that the Supreme
Court of Oregon did not refuse to enforce federal law since Oregon's procedures adequately
guided the jury. Id.
87. See id. at 2346-47. A majority of the Justices believed that the Due Process Clause
imposes a limit on punitive damages. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18. The Haslip Court also noted
that there should be a meaningful and adequate review by the trial court and subsequent
appellate review. Id. at 20. But see Oberg II, 316 Or. at 284 (The Supreme Court of Oregon
observed that Haslip did not require states to subject punitive damage awards to a postverdict
review, but only wanted to assure that the jury has had adequate guidance from the court.).
88. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
89. See ObergI, 114 S. Ct. at 2341. For discussion of safeguards provided by the Oregon
courts, see supra note 79.
90. Oberg I, 114 S.Ct. at 2345.
91. See id. at 2350.
92. Id. at 2348. The majority concluded that the English and early American courts
generally provided judicial review of the size of punitive damage awards. In opposition, the
dissent pointed out that the majority should have looked deeper into the historical inquiry of
jury verdicts. Id.; see Glenn H. Reynolds, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the
Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 142, 156 (1991)
("As a matter of common law, the assessment of uncertain damages during the Framing
generation was a protected jury function."); Robert E. Riggs, Constitutionalizing Punitive
Damages: The Limits of Due Process, 52 OGIO ST. L.J. 859, 899-900 (1991) ("[I]nstructions
admittedly leave wide discretion to the jury in setting the amount of the award, but the
conclusion does not necessarily follow that due process has been violated." Juries in early
America were permitted to determine both law and fact. Due process did not dictate the
abandonment of this procedure. The change occurred through common law development and
legislative enactment).
93. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 27.
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an effective job of limiting punitive damage awards. 94 Therefore, the
dissent concluded that the majority's eagerness was neither necessary nor
proper and the imposition of this burden upon Oregon was unjust. 95
Recently, the Court has been concerned with excessive awards handed
down by juries that show signs of partiality, passion, and prejudice. This is
quite relevant in the cases involving big businesses that hurt the local
consumer. This problem is voiced by Justice Stevens in the majority opinion
of the instant case: "Punitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary
deprivation of property." 96 Although on the surface it might appear that
Oregon provides adequate protection from arbitrary awards, as Justice
Ginsburg emphasized, Oregon's deviation from the national standard left it
an obvious target for judicial scrutiny. The significance of the decision in
the instant case was that the Court, in effect, used Oregon to establish a
policy for others to challenge the amount of punitive damages awarded
against them. Also, it appears that the Court has no tolerance for state
legislatures that abandon traditional and widely-upheld standards of the
judicial system. The impact of the instant case is not significant in and of
itself, but it does further the Court's desire to provide open access to the
judicial system for parties who are denied the due process of law in their
cases.

94. See Brief for Respondent at 69, Oberg I, 114 S. Ct. at 2331. It has been proven that
Oregon's average punitive damage award for products liability is less than the national
average. Id. The problem with this statistic is that the average is computed from only two
samples, which is an inadequate test base. But see Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive
Damages in ProductsLiability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with EmpiricalData, 78 IOWA L. REv.
1, 57 (1992) (Empirical evidence has shown that when states use judicial review on the size
of punitive damage awards, over half of the awards are appealed. Of those, more than half
result in reductions or reversals. In over 10% of the cases, the judges found the award to be
excessive.).
95. Oberg 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2350.
96. Id. at 2340.
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